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Canada’s newly elected prime minister, a seasoned technocrat with a resume polished in financial sectors rather than public squares, has entered office promising nothing short of a national renewal. But in the eerie glow of post-election euphoria, one must ask: Renewal for whom? And at what cost? Because beneath the headlines and the press conferences lies a harder truth: Canada has been Trumpetized.
It reminds me of a line my grandfather would often say: when the southern roar becomes a northern echo. In essence, he was reminding me that no place, however peaceful, exists in isolation from the ripple effects of what is happening elsewhere. To understand the full impact of what has transpired to Canada requires rewinding to 2018 when the first Trump administration blindsided us with steel and aluminium tariffs under the guise of “national security.” It wasn’t just about trade; it was a deliberate assertion of dominance. And it worked. Trump’s 25 percent tariff, in June 2018, destabilized Canada’s trade and economy, causing a 38 percent decline in steel exports and a 19 percent drop in aluminium exports, while retaliatory tariffs from the Trudeau government affected $16.6 billion in US exports to Canada. Both governments agreed to revoke these tariffs in May 2019.
In 2018, the Trudeau government, caught between diplomacy and desperation, responded with countermeasures that looked tough on paper but actually did little to shift the power imbalance. Then came the renegotiation of NAFTA into the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) in November 2018, which quietly embedded clauses that undermined Canadian regulatory autonomy in pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and dispute settlement. Canada, in effect, became structurally subordinate to US economic and political moods.
And now, with Trump inexplicably clawing his way back into the Oval Office under a cloud of investigations, court battles, and protest-scarred optics, the second wave of Trumpism has landed – wounded but no less dangerous. The difference this time is that Ottawa is no longer just reacting – it’s mutating. And with a corporate Mandarin now at Canada’s helm, is there any chance of breaching this mutation, which is strangling the economy and society alike? The theatrics during the Oval Office meeting between Prime Minister Carney and President Trump make the average Canadian brace for a bumpy ride.
There is no denying that the Prime Minister has emerged from the corporate-financial strata with the confidence of a Bay Street banker and the caution of a man who’s read too many risk reports. His campaign spoke eloquently of “rebalancing partnerships”, “fortifying Canadian competitiveness”, and “protecting economic sovereignty.” But there’s a paradox baked in. This is a leader who, while outwardly distancing himself from US volatility, built his entire professional reputation on cross-border financial integration and fiscal orthodoxy. His strongest backers include firms and industries that benefit most from stable (read: acquiescent) trade relations with the US.
In my private conversations, several insiders – advisers, lobbyists, even one disgruntled former aide – have remarked that Carney “understands how the US system works and isn’t naïve enough to fight it head-on.” Translation: expect diplomacy cloaked in deference, diversification wrapped in delay.
Indeed, CUSMA’s infamous sunset clause, which requires periodic review and mutual consent to renew, means every Canadian economic plan carries an American veto pen lurking in its shadow. Under Trump’s first term, this clause was a leash. In his second term, it may become a noose. Worse still, the regulatory creep of US policies, from digital trade standards to food labelling rules, continues to edge into Canadian policymaking. And with the Trump administration likely to push a second-phase industrial reshoring plan Canada could again find its core industries even further marginalized.
Meanwhile, the average Canadian family is understandably distracted by the unrelenting squeeze of inflation. Grocery prices have risen substantially over the past year, while wages, the Consumer Price Index and inflation rates have stagnated in real terms. Home ownership is out of reach for most young Canadians, and rent across major urban centres has hit record highs.
This economic pain is a fertile ground for political theatre. Expect a summer of symbolic gestures: incentives for domestic manufacturing, vague promises of food price controls, and perhaps another televised “negotiation” trip to Washington, complete with firm handshakes and gentle capitulations. But true sovereignty requires the political courage to rewrite the playbook, not reframe it. If the last decade has taught us anything, sovereignty isn’t just about borders, it’s about decisions. Who gets to make them? Who benefits? And who pays the price when they go wrong?
So, what would measurable, actionable, and resilient trade independence for Canada look like? Below are the policy options we should consider:
1. Create a National Strategic Trade Fund (NSTF)
Imagine a war chest – not for bombs, but for buffering. A federally managed fund that would insulate high-risk sectors like semiconductors, critical minerals, and AI start-ups from the volatility of US demand. Modelled loosely on Germany’s KfW development bank, it would finance Canadian-grown supply chains in tech, energy, and food logistics. This isn’t protectionism it’s strategic oxygen. To put this in context: imagine a tech incubator in Winnipeg that builds a promising AI application for wildfire prediction. Without bridge financing, they either sell to a Bay Area firm or fold. With an NSTF backstop, they can grow, hire locally, and export on their own terms. This is how nations move from being market participants to market shapers.
Germany’s story might not be perfect. But it shows us what long-range, patient public capital can do when it’s not beholden to quarterly returns or election cycles. The KfW model, by design, exists outside the short-term political fray. Canada needs a version of this built for our context, our industries, and our future. Because sovereignty doesn’t begin at the border it begins in how we choose to invest in ourselves.
2. Create a National Digital Innovation Charter (NDIC)
In Canada, the booming tech sector, especially in AI, quantum computing and clean energy, is suffering from what economists call value chain exile because nearly 90 percent of our digital infrastructure hardware is imported, and most of it via US-controlled procurement networks.
For example, in 2023, a Canadian cleantech firm developing hydrogen fuel cells was locked out of a lucrative US Defense Department contract, not because of capacity issues, but because it wasn’t “domestically integrated.” That’s Washington-speak for not American-owned. Meanwhile, homegrown AI labs in Toronto and Montreal are now being poached – quietly – by US venture capitalists offering funding in exchange for IP relocation.
To counter such situations, Canada should create a National Digital Innovation Charter with teeth – not just tax credits, but mandatory local cloud storage, encryption standards, and investment in Canadian-controlled platforms. It matters because every time we log into an American-built app, we are feeding data into an ecosystem that Canada neither owns nor governs. Worse still, Canadian start-ups are routinely bought out by US firms before they scale, stripping value and jobs out of the country. By simply looking beyond the headlines, Canada has brilliant tech minds, but a venture capital (VC) ecosystem is overtly dominated by US cash. That means our brightest are building for foreign exits. A truly sovereign Canada can’t be running its 21st century economy on 20th century dependency logic. An effective way forward can be to cap foreign acquisition of Canadian digital infrastructure firms and simultaneously create a sovereign AI cloud funded by Crown tech corporations. We can even use the procurement law to mandate Canadian-built tech in public service to help encourage “Made in Canada”.
3. Legislate a national ownership floor to counter financial weaponization
The federal government should mandate Canadian institutional investors (e.g. pension and infrastructure funds) to invest a minimum quota into Canadian-controlled strategic sectors. It matters because average taxpayers unknowingly helping finance foreign takeovers of Canadian infrastructure because Canada’s top investment funds chase global returns but often ignore domestic capacity-building.
Walking through Canada’s infrastructure base also reveals a tangled web of foreign influence hidden beneath layers of minority investments, private equity deals, and strategic partnerships. Foreign direct investment used to be the gold-standard to gauge a country’s economic health but given the Trumpetization of the globalization matrix, the same is being recalculated based on the value for money to value for national interests. Though Canadian regulations technically cap foreign ownership, the reality is far more complex, and the reality is that the offshore-linked firms exert meaningful sway over key sectors, often bypassing our direct ownership restrictions.
For example, in April 2025, Rogers celebrated a partnership with Blackstone, granting 49.9 percent control over its fibre-optic infrastructure division, but financial protectionism suggests that it is likely to influence pricing models and broadband expansion strategies. Similarly, according to Bloomberg Terminal, approximately 33.8 percent of BCE Inc.’s outstanding shares as of Q4 2024 were held by US and European institutional investors, including major asset managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and Amundi. While this figure does not appear directly in BCE’s public financial filings, it reflects a significant foreign stake – a point increasingly cited by protectionist voices who warn that such ownership levels may influence strategic decisions over Canada’s telecom infrastructure, including 5G rollout and broadband expansion.CN Rail’s largest institutional stakeholders also include BlackRock and Vanguard, holding 40 percent of total shares, shaping cross-border logistics agreements and rail tariff policies, while institutional investors from abroad hold significant stakes in Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC).
On the portside, entities like Maersk (Denmark) and COSCO (China) maintain significant operational influence at the Port of Vancouver and Prince Rupert, particularly through container shipping and terminal leasing agreements.
Therefore, every time a Canadian startup is swallowed early and our critical infrastructure is sublet to foreign hands we edge further away from self-determination. Ottawa must draw a firmer line. A national ownership floor – say 60 percent – for core infrastructure isn’t just about economics; it’s about agency. Add to that a smart policy mix, bringing home pension capital for R&D, offering tax shelters to reward reinvestment in Canadian innovation, and putting the brakes on the silent sell-off of sovereignty masked as globalization.
4. Reform CUSMA clauses on regulatory lock-in
CUSMA currently locks Canada into US-favoured IP protections and limits flexibility in food safety and drug patenting. Canada must initiate a review process under CUSMA’s six-year revision clause (due in 2026), specifically targeting Chapter 20 and dispute resolution constraints. For example, take pharmaceuticals. CUSMA extended patent protection for biologics by two years (to ten years), which delays the availability of cheaper generic versions. According to the Parliamentary Budget Officer’s 2019 assessment, this single clause could cost Canadian consumers and provincial health plans up to $169 million annually by 2029. In a country where prescription drug affordability is already a crisis, that figure is more than just a line item it’s a chokehold.
Of particular urgency is Chapter 20’s dispute resolution framework. Though ostensibly a modernization of NAFTA’s provisions, it empowers state-to-state arbitration where US leverage overwhelms. In the case of softwood lumber and despite a long history of WTO rulings in Canada’s favour, successive US administrations continue to impose punitive tariffs, currently at 14.54 percent as of late 2024, costing the Canadian forestry sector over $1.5 billion annually and undermining thousands of jobs in British Columbia, Quebec, and the Maritimes.
Under the guise of “harmonization” Canada’s food safety rules are also increasingly shaped by US agribusiness norms. CUSMA’s Article 9.6 allows US exporters to challenge Canadian food inspection measures as trade barriers. This erodes the precautionary principle that underpins our regulatory philosophy, especially in areas like GMO labelling and pesticide thresholds. As a result, Health Canada must regularly weigh US trade retaliation risks before updating food safety policies even when domestic science and consumer preferences call for stricter standards.
Meanwhile, Canadian farmers have also been impacted. They used to export wheat, beef, and pulses with confidence. But if they choose climate-smart practices like methane-reducing feed or regenerative soil tech, they risk losing access to US approved supply chains that still favour conventional methods. Under CUSMA, US agro-giants also gained expanded access to Canadian dairy markets while simultaneously using domestic subsidies to undercut Canadian wheat prices abroad. In early 2024, Saskatchewan’s agriculture sector suffered over $2.5 billion in export losses, with China’s 100% tariffs on canola oil and meal and the US’s 25% tariffs on Canadian goods severely disrupting trade, limiting market access, and driving down commodity prices.
To realise the dream of sovereignty, Canada needs to renegotiate CUSMA clauses that give US agribusiness disproportionate access to Canadian markets, especially in dairy, poultry, and grain, and restore protective tariffs where needed. We have to remind ourselves that agriculture is not just economics, it’s cultural sovereignty. When Canada can’t control what’s grown, sold, or processed on its soil, it risks becoming a logistical wing of the US food empire.
In collaboration with the provinces, Canada should also create regional food reserves and a national agricultural resilience strategy and offer direct-to-market grants for local producers to bypass US dominated chains. This can be done by launching a Canadian Farm Sovereignty Council to track cross-border unfair trade practices.
5. Subsidize on-shore pharma & build emergency stockpiles
From a pharmaceutical standpoint, CUSMA’s Chapter 20, as noted, extended data protection periods for biologics, effectively delaying the entry of cheaper generics into Canadian markets by up to two years. As a result, Canadians are paying 20 percent to 40 percent more for common life-saving drugs than their European counterparts.
During the COVID-19 recovery years, Canada also found itself scrambling for US-made acetaminophen and insulin components. Health Canada was forced to fast-track emergency import permits for drugs we used to make at home in Windsor and Mississauga – plants shuttered years ago after free-trade-era consolidations.
To salvage matters, the federal government should consider fast-tracking federal subsidies for onshore pharma manufacturing and build emergency stockpiles of generic medicines to deal with any future pandemic. To fortify this, the federal government, in collaboration with the provinces, should incentivize universities to patent Canadian IP in-country and not the US.
6. Fully activate CETA and expand digital trade with the EU
While the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) is technically “provisional,” less than two-thirds of Canadian exporters take advantage of its benefits. A domestic incentives program that matches EU market-entry grants with compliance training could double participation. Simultaneously, Canada must negotiate a “Digital Addendum” to CETA, allowing for shared data hosting, fintech collaboration, and AI research independence.
